The first thing which strikes our attention is, that the executive authority, with few exceptions, is to be vested in a single magistrate. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself. It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall. It allows for uniform prohibitory trade regulations that would eventually lead to privileged trading in the British markets. These programs were funded primarily by a tariff on imports and a highly controversial excise tax on whiskey.
Numbers must be so great as to render combination difficult, or they are rather a source of danger than of security. It was desirable that the sense of the people should operate in the choice of the person to whom so important a trust was to be confided. And how far does this combination characterize the plan which has been reported by the convention? As this government is organized, it would be dangerous to trust the President with such powers. We know how much the powers of Europe have interfered with Sweden. A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to such complicated investigations. The one can prescribe no rules concerning the commerce or currency of the nation; the other is in several respects the arbiter of commerce, and in this capacity can establish markets and fairs, can regulate weights and measures, can lay embargoes for a limited time, can coin money, can authorize or prohibit the circulation of foreign coin.
A candidate had to obtain a majority of votes in the electoral college to be named president. Anti-Federalists made a strong case and soon won their point. The vice president is chosen in the same manner with the difference that the senate makes the decision if a majority is not obtained. The Vice-President is to be chosen in the same manner with the President; with this difference, that the Senate is to do, in respect to the former, what is to be done by the House of Representatives, in respect to the latter. Subsequently they were printed in manyeditions and translated to several languages. . The essays appeared in bookform in 1788, with an introduction by Hamilton.
And this will be thought no inconsiderable recommendation of the Constitution, by those who are able to estimate the share which the executive in every government must necessarily have in its good or ill administration. Thus without corrupting the body of the people, the immediate agents in the election will at least enter upon the task free from any sinister bias. And to take the senator of any State from his seat as senator, to place him in that of President of the Senate, would be to exchange, in regard to the State from which he came, a constant for a contingent vote. There is hardly an instance where a republic trusted its executive so long with much power; nor is it warranted by modern republics. Madison claims that the strongest roots of factions lie in the unequal distribution of property. In writing this essay, the author sought to convince the people of New York of the merits of the proposed Constitution. They are to vote for two persons.
He represented New York at the Annapolis Convention, and participated as a delegate to the Constitutional Convention at which he proposed a tremendously strong centralized government with a president who served for life. The union serves as a better means to promote commerce, especially in competition with Europe. Analysis This paper presents one of the more peculiar aspects of the American Constitution: the electoral college. But this was to be accomplished in a special way. The one would have a like concurrent authority in appointing to offices; the other is the sole author of all appointments.
But the multiplication of the Executive adds to the difficulty of detection in either case. How could they better gratify this, than by raising a creature of their own to the chief magistracy of the Union? The electors would meet in each state and transmit their decision to the national government. No senator, representative, or other person holding a place of trust or profit under the United States, can be of the numbers of the electors. The appointment of an extraordinary person, as Vice-President, has been objected to as superfluous, if not mischievous. The experience of other nations will afford little instruction on this head. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit.
The delegation of power is, in most of them, only for one year. Theme: Presidential Power Focus: the issue of energy and how these ingredients can be combined with others that are safe in the republican sense? It is here too that they may be most pernicious. The one can confer no privileges whatever; the other can make denizens of aliens, noblemen of commoners; can erect corporations with all the rights incident to corporate bodies. The tenure by which they are to hold their places. One is, that to secure at all times the possibility of a definite resolution of the body, it is necessary that the President should have only a casting vote. In the conduct of war, in which the energy of the Executive is the bulwark of the national security, every thing would be to be apprehended from its plurality. Perhaps the question now before the public may, in its consequences, afford melancholy proofs of the effects of this despicable frailty, or rather detestable vice, in the human character.
The purpose, of course, it to counter arguments claiming the presidency has too much power and might become a monarchy. Hamilton viewed the system as superior to direct popular election. By that time, hopefully, the Senate would have considered and either approved or disapproved of such commissions. Jay was responsible for only a few of the 85 articles. We know that there scarcely ever was an election of such an officer without the interposition of foreign powers. The same that ought to be given to those who tell us that a government, the whole power of which would be in the hands of the elective and periodical servants of the people, is an aristocracy, a monarchy, and a despotism.
If the maxim should be admitted to be applicable to the case, I should contend that the advantage on that side would not counterbalance the numerous disadvantages on the opposite side. This quadrennial power cannot be justified by ancient history. One has the right to command the armed forces while the other in addition to that can declare war and raise and regulate armed forces by his own authority. A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to such complicated investigations. Every jurist of that kingdom, and every other man acquainted with its Constitution, knows, as an established fact, that the prerogative of making treaties exists in the crown in its utomst plentitude; and that the compacts entered into by the royal authority have the most complete legal validity and perfection, independent of any other sanction. But the constitutions of several of the States expressly declare their governors to be commanders-in-chief, as well of the army as navy; and it may well be a question, whether those of New Hampshire and Massachusetts, in particular, do not, in this instance, confer larger powers upon their respective governors, than could be claimed by a President of the United States. The other consideration is, that as the Vice-President may occasionally become a substitute for the President, in the supreme executive magistracy, all the reasons which recommend the mode of election prescribed for the one, apply with great if not with equal force to the manner of appointing the other.
One is subject to personal punishment and disgrace through impeachment while the other is sacred and inviolable. It unites in an eminent degree all the advantages, the union of which was to be wished for. The enlightened well-wishers to this species of government must at least hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation; since they can never admit its truth, without at the same time admitting the condemnation of their own principles. They give, therefore, one hundred and eighty-two votes. It also provides for a federal navy that will assist the United States in establishing commercial privileges in this hemisphere. This clause provides for ratification of the Constitution by nine out of thirteen specially called conventions.